landscape-1
8 copy
DPP07D805170E3334.2.flat
_B4U2446-Edit.2
Garmsir-001656.2.flat
DPP07D8030D151839.2
landscape-6
landscape-3
DPP07D8031B0D1844
DPP07D804180E3725
landscape-5
20
41
Garmsir-001668.2.flat
DPP07D8051A0D1147.2.flat
landscape-2
landscape-4
Previous Next Play Pause

The Effectiveness of US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan 2001-2010: Why RAND missed the point

(Major General (Ret’d) Andrew Mackay, Commander Steve Tatham PhD, Dr Lee Rowland) This paper challenges the findings of a 2012 RAND study into US Information Operations (IO) in Afghanistan. Whilst agreeing with RAND that if the overall IO mission in Afghanistan is defined as convincing most residents of contested areas to side decisively with the Afghan Government and its foreign allies against the Taliban insurgency then the US mission has failed, it fundamentally disagrees with RAND's conclusions and subsequent recommendations. As operations in Afghanistan draw to an end and critical eyes retrospectively examine the 13 year long mission it is vital that IO is not discredited; the paper finds its original intent laudable but argues its application has been very poor, based upon outdated and failed models of communication, an absence of intelligent customers and an over-reliance upon marketing and PR techniques which were never designed for conflictual societies.

Buy The Book

Behavioural Conflict can be purchased at:

 
    
 

Help For Heroes

We are proud to be working with Help For Heroes

100% of Author profits from sales of Behavioural Conflict are donated to Help for Heroes

Get in touch

We love getting feedback from our readers.  Please contact us to discuss any of the issues in the book, our blog or any press coverage

bThis email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.