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# Special Series

**Strategic Communication & Influence Operations: Do We Really Get It?**

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# Strategic Communication & Influence Operations: Do We Really Get It?

Dr Lee Rowland & Cdr Steve Tatham RN

The last 2-3 years have seen an explosion in interest in the application of influence as a tool for achieving military objectives. This is not new, the military have always sought to exert influence – albeit at times unwittingly. However, two significant events have brought the issue to further prominence - the publication of JDP3-40<sup>1</sup> and the deployment of 52 Brigade to Helmand Province in 2007/8. This article does not intend to debate either in any detail – a quick search of *inter* and *intra* nets will provide plenty of information for the curious reader – but there are two issues worthy of slightly more discussion. The first concerns 52 Brigade's deployment. When Brigadier Andrew Mackay led 52 Brigade to Helmand Province<sup>2</sup> he did so having examined previous kinetic based deployments and concluded that these, for various reasons, had not achieved the effects that he envisaged for his mission. For him the consent of the population was utterly key and would not, nor could it, be achieved by hard power alone or even with hard power primacy; as he developed his operational design he felt frustrated that existing doctrine did not adequately prepare him to operate within the influence arena. The second is that Andrew Mackay subsequently became one of the driving forces behind JDP3-40 and in particular the forceful articulation of the 'centrality' of influence. However, the 'how to do it' guidance still lags behind the emphasis on and enthusiasm for, its use. The Land Warfare Centre's recent classified publication *The Influence Handbook* is a very definite step in the right direction and yet, in our view, it still leaves questions unanswered. It is all very well to state a requirement but when it is not matched by a detailed 'how' it becomes not a challenge but a burden. In *'Behavioural Conflict : From General to Strategic Corporal'*<sup>3</sup>, Mackay and Tatham explained how 52 Brigade looked outside of the military staff and education environments – for at that time in neither was the 'how' articulated. Mackay's search took in Behavioural Economics and Group Psychology and in doing so he found himself finding answers in books such as *'The Age of the Unthinkable'*<sup>4</sup>, *'Nudge'*<sup>5</sup> and *'Predictably Irrational'*<sup>6</sup> - none of which currently feature in the Chief of Defence Staff's recommended reading list at the Staff Colleges! Whilst such research is commendable it was also, arguably, indicative of a failure of military education, nor does it seem reasonable that Commanders should have to be 'hunter gatherers' of strategic thinking but should instead have resources readily on tap to assist them. Today the landscape is different and *The Influence Handbook* fills many of the gaps that once existed – but not all. This paper seeks to provide greater clarity in two key areas – Target Audience Analysis (TAA) and Measurements of Effectiveness (MOE).

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## Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40: *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*. Available to download at: <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/JDWP/JointDoctrinePublicationjdp340SecurityAndStabilisationTheMilitaryContribution.htm>

<sup>2</sup> Op Herrick 7 UK Deployment to southern Afghanistan between October 2007 – April 2008

<sup>3</sup> The Shrivenham Papers (No.9) Dec 2009. Available for download at : <http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/monographs/091216%20FINAL.pdf/view>

<sup>4</sup> Ramo J, *The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us And What We Can Do About It*. Little, Brown and Company, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Thaler R & Sunstein C, *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. Yale University Press, 2008.

<sup>6</sup> Ariely D, *Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions*, HarperCollins, 2009.

## Target Audience Analysis (TAA) – The Key

We believe that this title should be stamped in bold, underlined and coloured glowing vibrant red on every page of every piece of official documentation associated with Influence! Understanding the audience is the beginning and end of all military influence endeavours. Without TAA, influence success is dependent upon randomness, luck and coincidence – in short, ‘a fluke’. With scientifically derived, methodologically driven TAA, success in influence becomes exponentially more likely but, and here is a note of caution, never an absolute certainty. How do we undertake Target Audience Analysis? Received wisdom is that we search for opinion polls but, for example, in Afghanistan (the most polled population on earth) we know opinion polls can deceive and indeed the results are often defined not by the individual but by the way the question was asked by the pollster. Opinion Polls also tend to be seen as popularity or progress indicators when in reality both of these are largely irrelevant to achieving influence objectives. For example, it is our wish that Afghans not plant IEDs<sup>7</sup>. In truth, whether the Afghan likes ISAF soldiers is irrelevant (although undeniably an added bonus) to the influence campaign which simply seeks to change behaviour not opinion. And so the first step in the influence process, even before TAA, is to decide what it is you are seeking to influence and be consistent. The second step is to accept that unless you have been very lucky the data available to you was probably produced to answer someone else’s problem or question. As we will see it is far better to have bespoke TAA which properly matches your influence objectives. Three examples of bespoke TAA taken from the recently conducted ‘Rich Contextual Understanding (RCU)<sup>8</sup>’ project for the US government reveals where received wisdom is at odds with reality:

- Taliban oppose education – Right? Some indeed may, but the RCU revealed that in South Waziristan there were more schools under the Taliban than there are now. So how did we reach this conclusion? Quite simply we saw images of burning schools but in almost all incidents the RCU research reveals that this was a result of have/have not rivalry amongst different socio-economic groups rather than religious ideology or zealotry. Thus if we had sought to influence the local population against the Taliban by highlighting this as an endemic religious issue the influence campaign would have failed.
- In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Islam is the pre-eminent influence on young adult male behaviour...right? Islam is important – yes. But the RCU indicates it is not as important a behavioural trigger for young men as privacy from their parents, as football and nationalism. So an influence campaign aimed at this audience, grounded in Islamic references or context, might be less successful than one grounded in the fortunes of, say, Manchester United!
- In Afghanistan the tribe is the defining feature...right? Wrong. Despite the importance of tribes, regions and land are considered much more important. So influence campaigns vested in tribal culture may well resonate but may be less successful than ones focussed on geography and land usage. Any reader unfamiliar with Afghanistan has only to read Rory Stewart’s book ‘*The Places in Between*<sup>9</sup>’ to see how his guides refused to accompany him to the next village or valley, or beyond the next mountain because it was someone else’s territory.

TAA – when undertaken properly - is an extremely complex process and whilst its methodology is comparatively simple, its implementation is most certainly not. For it to have any chance of success, it must achieve at least four overarching objectives:

- The precise **identification** of optimal Target Audiences.

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<sup>7</sup> Improvised Explosive Devices.

<sup>8</sup> A classified project undertaken by US and UK research organisations to help map population in discreet geographical locations.

<sup>9</sup> Stewart R, *The Places in Between*, Picador, 2005.

- The measurement of the ‘**influenceability**’ of that audience.
- Identification of the best **process** to influence that audience.
- Produce and deploy the triggers that will effectively and **measurably change** the audience’s behaviour.

TAA, therefore, aims to construct a robust profile of the audience and how it can be influenced by an appropriately conceived and deployed message campaign. One key feature of this approach is that messages are developed in a **bottom-up** fashion, with them being constructed from a process of measurement and research, and subsequently derived from reliable knowledge of the audience. As Mackay and Tatham noted in ‘Behavioural Conflict’: “*Whitehall messages [are] a diluted and distant memory by the time they reach the tactical level...[and] they may actually have no relevance at ground level anyway*<sup>10</sup>”. It should be clear why this approach is far more effective than simple marketing approaches, or cultural understanding. There exists no universal model of communication, applicable to all groups and cultures. All communication efforts must be tailored to the local dynamics and with respect to the behaviours one is seeking to change. Because audiences are multi-faceted and cannot be grouped as a population, influencing the differing component groups of a society requires precisely targeted methods and approaches: One message – no matter how culturally relevant – does not fit all. Working out who to influence, why, how, when, and whether it is possible, constitute the first steps of TAA. Often it will be necessary to influence one group to influence another. Remember the process of influence is not necessarily to make a particular group like ‘us’ or ‘our’ ideas – although this is always an extra ‘bonus.’ Influence is designed to affect behaviour.

## Conducting TAA

TAA is hard to do; harder still when your military education and training have prepared you to be an Infantryman, Artilleryman, Naval Officer, Logistician, Airman or Engineer – but not a TAA specialist. Yet it is from these backgrounds and many more alike, that augmentees in Influence Cells are traditionally plucked. Whilst the UK’s 15 Psychological Operations Group (POG)<sup>11</sup>, for example, may well have a PsyOps Support Element (PSE) proper TAA is potentially overwhelming and a task that, as ABN0/3<sup>12</sup> and *Influence Handbook* note, can take months. The Defence Intelligence Service’s Human Factor’s, DIS(HF), group is a huge force multiplier but its small band of experts have only so many people and only so much time. Despite the massive strides forward it is thus our view that the military is simply not equipped, trained or funded to undertake proper mass TAA and we worry that a fundamental weakness of current doctrine is that it may be guilty of building false expectations amongst its readers. Current publications do not address, for example, the boundaries of achievable influence activity – is it, for example, a province or country wide activity or is it a much more local, tactical, tool? Current UK structures may well be able to support small scale tactical influence skirmishes but could they support a much larger campaign – as in the case of, say, Andrew Mackay’s deployment. Mackay’s view at that time was that it could not.

TAA may necessitate desk based research, expert interviews, simple polling if available, field-based structured depth interviews, and remote monitoring of current behaviour (perhaps using Intelligence). Some, none or all of these may be possible but the Influence Cell needs to use anything (although note the caveat about polling made earlier) that is available to build up a picture of the problem space and the relationships and behaviours between groups in that space. The Influence Officer should endeavour to understand the broad activities that cause the problem (e.g. why farmers grow poppy instead

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<sup>10</sup> *Op.Cit.*

<sup>11</sup> A tri-service military unit based at the Defence, Intelligence and Security Centre in Chicksands composed of regular and reserve personnel trained in Psychological Operations. Similar capabilities are maintained, to a greater to lesser extent, by most NATO members.

<sup>12</sup> Allied Briefing Note 03.

of wheat), the behaviours that people exhibit, and why (e.g. how they source the poppy seed, how they sell the product, why they chose one market place over another, logistics etc.) and groups with which they affiliate and interact (e.g. the farmers, the traders, the labourers, government, ISAF etc.). The purpose of this analysis should be to hone in on one specific facet where influence might potentially be exerted to good effect. At this stage the Influence Officer needs to specify the nature of the desired behaviour change as separate from the intended outcome of the behaviour change.

So, in summary they will need to:

- Develop an understanding of the problem space by breaking down the general problem into smaller logically connected parts. Identify the change of which behaviour will yield results that measurably contribute to achieving the project objectives.
- Identify the group that is most accessible, amenable to influence, and closely related to the survival of the non-desired target behaviour.
- Research the target group (the group whose behaviour needs to change) and determine its psychological, cultural, and social topography.
- Identify and analyse groups auxiliary to the target group in terms of their accessibility, influenceability, influence over, and source credibility vis-a-vis the target group. On the basis of a tabulated analysis a target audience is identified on which the campaign will focus (Note the distinction here between a target group and a target audience: the target group is the group whose behaviour the influence campaign seeks to change, whereas the target audience is the group that the communication intervention seeks to reach.)

## Intervention Strategy

So, you have all this data...but what to do with it? Blindly applying it according to some loose assumptions about human behaviour will not work, and is likely to be detrimental. Again there is a weakness in our structures that the appropriate expertise to help with this is scarce. It is both a blessing and a problem that plenty of models of behavioural change can be found in academic literature, for the enthusiastic Influence Officer can pick from a *smorgasboard* of ideas; the problem with sticking rigidly to any one of these is that they all have unique strengths and weaknesses and some broad familiarity with the concepts of such models is needed if one seeks to adapt them to specific campaign objectives. An argument perhaps that the selection of Influence Officers should be a little less random than it currently seems – where are all the Armed Force's Psychology graduates employed and why is influence not regarded as a mainstream career thread to which previous practitioners return again and again?

To give just one example, consider the work of social psychologist Bibb Latané on Impact Theory in social influence. Latané showed that the strength of social conformity depends on a number of factors, such as the number of people in a group, the group's strength, and the group's immediacy. As the number of people in a group increases, each individual has less of an impact. Strong groups exert greater influence over the individuals in the group, as there is increased need for social respect and social support. The closer an individual is to his group in time and space during the influence campaign, the greater will be the exertion of influence pressure. Taken together, these three factors can predict the amount of conformity of an individual to the group. For our purposes, it becomes essential understanding of these factors when taking into consideration whether to use one motivation over another as an influence lever. If the motivation is more likely to strengthen the group, is shared widely amongst the group, and will cohere groups in time and space, then it is a better trigger to use than one that does the opposite. This may seem obvious, but if the influence practitioner is not thinking beyond motivations or attitudes to the dynamics of groups, then the intervention strategy could well be useless. In keeping with the poppy

example used thus far, let's briefly examine the utility of Social Impact Theory. It would seem reasonable to assume that the correct audience to target with a message campaign for reducing poppy cultivation would be farmers. Yet this may actually be detrimental to our objectives. Farmers perceivably constitute a relatively small group compared with the labourers that are used to harvest the opium, they may not be a 'strong' group given that many may be in competition with each other, and in many areas they may be substantially displaced in space and time. In order to change farmers' behaviour, perhaps the stronger, more cohesive, proximal, and larger group of 'non-farming male villagers', who may exert greater social normative influence upon farmers, is the best optimal group to target. Consequently, the message campaign will need to utilise different motivations – amongst other psychosocial attributes – to influence that audience, given that it is unlikely that farmers and non-farmers are identical with regard to what would influence them. Only scientifically driven and research-based TAA can enable the exquisite understanding of these group dynamics.

This is but one idea; in *Behavioural Conflict* Mackay and Tatham examined Prospect and Choice Theory and found examples where both could be applied in the UK Military context. The *Influence Handbook* offers much useful advice and guidance but the Commanders and strategists must accept the reality – that enthusiastic but ultimately amateur dabbling is never a substitute for proper and expert subject matter expertise

## Deployment

Having designed the strategy of intervention, it is time to put the campaign into operation; for the military the natural reaction is that this will be through the well trodden paths of Info Ops, PsyOps and Media Operations. However, in order to ensure that the message is effective, it may be necessary to look beyond traditional TV-Print-Radio media, as these are in many instances saturated and often mistrusted. We need to understand new communication modes, such as front-line staff, local events, social networking sites; or though less familiar territory such as, in Afghanistan, Shuras and other organic communication conduits. This requires a precise understanding of the communication environment, much of which should have been researched in earlier phases. It also requires and element of risk taking. There are three key decisions to be made here:

- Message Resonance: will the message resonate with the audience such that it can be expected to influence their behaviour?
- Message Acknowledgement: Is it reasonable to expect the audience to acknowledge the message?
- Message Delivery: Can the message reach the audience?


If any of these fail, then the campaign will be in jeopardy, regardless of how accurate and brilliantly conceived your intervention strategy. In his recent book, *Communication Power*<sup>13</sup>, Manuel Castells argues that the battle for the human mind is largely fought in the processes of communication, where power relations are played out. Yet, in our increasingly networked society, the pervasiveness of communications networks means that communication power is no longer the preserve of the few, but is now the domain in which the masses operate. This communication network is at the same time global and local, generic and customised in a constantly evolving fashion. The new form of socialised communication – which replaces the old form of one-to-many – is mass self-communication, where many communicate with many. It is self-generated in content, self directed in emission, and self-selected in reception. Failure to understand and exploit this shift in communication will lead to failure of an otherwise carefully designed campaign and we are not at all sure that the MoD is institutionally capable or resourced to monitor such changes.

Finally, we need a healthy dose of realism in our deployment. Our (admittedly) developing research suggests that at normal tempo, with Media Ops, IO and more generic

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<sup>13</sup> Castells M, *Communication Power*, OUP Oxford, 2009.

Strat Communication's teams working away (shown in red in the diagram below) the best that might be achieved with our informational effect on the target audience is to largely oscillate in tandem with the effort deployed (shown in green). Some days good, others not so good. But a major push may well be rewarded with an uptake in effect, albeit one that will only slowly rise (marked by X) and will decay back to the same start point but, the evidence (and experience of those returning from operations) suggests, not to a new elevated position. However an unintended incident – say, collateral damage – will have an immediate information effect on our target audience and a much slower return to below stasis (marked by Y). We have called these 'moments of influence' and, if proven, their implication is clear – negative moments create over time a trend that is uniformly downwards and, as we know from experience, the *sustainability* of enhanced positive moments is largely untenable in a conflictual environment.



This leads us to consider three new definitions of contemporary terms. In *'Strategic Communication: A Primer'*<sup>14</sup> Tatham suggested that Strategic Communication was defined as:

*"A systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences, identifies effective conduits, and develops and promotes ideas and opinions through those conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour".*

This model allows us to express it slightly more simply and allows a more succinct definition of two more terms that consistently cause difficulty in military doctrine and discussion:

- **Strategic Communication.** A paradigm that recognises that information & perception effect target audience behaviour and that activity must be calibrated against first, second and third order effects.
- **Strategic Communications.** The processes and sequencing of information for carefully targeted audiences
- **Influence:** The desired end result of Strategic Communication.

This is important because it places influence (both military and non-military) beneath the wider concept of Strategic Communication. For the UK, where doctrine appears to suggest

<sup>14</sup> The Defence Academy R&AB Papers No.28 *'Strategic Communication : A Primer'*, 2008. Available to download at: [http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/special/08\(28\)ST.pdf/view](http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/special/08(28)ST.pdf/view)



that only the military conduct influence, it important that the cumulative efforts of all government departments and NGOs are recognised as contributing to the influence effect.

## **Evaluation .. it really is Rocket Science!**

There is a pressing need to establish proper Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for Influence Operations. The challenge of causality bedevils MOE: how can one **prove** that the message has affected behaviour rather than the effect being due to an unknown and extraneous variable? For MOE in influence to be meaningful it must link the message with the desired and anticipated outcome – and ultimately, defeat of the enemy. It is common practice amongst marketers to accept Measure of Performance (MOP) as an indicator of effectiveness (e.g., the number of people who watched an advert for, say, woolly hats). Sometimes MOP will be correlated with an MOE (increase in sales), but for our purposes this is inadequate. First, correlation does not imply causation – just because sales increase, does not mean it was because people watched the advert, but because it's winter and there is a huge demand for woolly hats. Second, the battle space is a far more complex behavioural environment than the high street, where increased sales are the only end goal. MOE for military objectives needs vastly more brainpower to get right. The first consideration in MOE is to establish what it is that you would expect to change if the message has an effect. Attitudes and beliefs are often assumed to be the targets of message campaigns, but frankly, who cares what other people think? And here we must be careful. Doctrine tells us Media Ops is a key component of Influence – and so it is. But as we all know Media Ops success is invariably measured by the number of positive stories that appear in DMC's morning cuts – this is not a meaningful measure for influence activity. Logically, we would only care if there was an indication that they thought in a particular manner, and if there is an indication, then it can only be expressed in a behaviour (e.g., talking, frowning, moving, sitting still in refusal, etc.). The guiding principle of MOE for influence therefore has to be: establish links between the action (the message) and the effect (behaviour).

To understand changes in behaviour, and how those behaviours are linked to the unique culturally fluctuating psycho-social characteristics of the population (for instance, what people do if they are angry), prior research is imperative. Prior research is also necessary to establish baseline measures in order to draw comparisons between behaviour before and after the message campaign. Despite the fundamental importance of research, deriving behavioural indicators also requires innovation and lateral thought. For example, in Bosnia Major General John Drewienkiewicz noted the presence of cabbages on market stalls as a positive indicator for operations NATO forces were mounting – the greater the number of cabbages the better the supply chain, the roads, the market economy and, critically, the confidence of locals to both grow crops and venture out to market them. This is a comparatively well known example - there are many other ways of achieving the same effect. For example, 52 Brigade utilized an IT system called Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) – a system developed by USAID<sup>15</sup> to identify the underlying causes of instability and conflict. But before finding the means it is absolutely necessary to establish the need – particularly with Commanders - and include it as part of the operational design. During the Kosovo crisis the United States disrupted electrical distribution systems, denying power to large portions of Serbia. This action was based on an implicit assumption that this would sap the will of the Serbian people and make victory easier for the allies. This is an enormous assumption to make. It is not at all far-fetched to surmise that disrupting power supply to the people may actually strengthen their resolve. Moreover, if the disruption of electricity is designed to sap the will, it must be assumed that there is 'will' in the first place – and if there is will, how do you know? What indicators exist that demonstrate the will of the Serbs? If there are none, then how can one expect to establish an MOE for the intended effect of disrupting the power supply? The reader should see that the issues surrounding MOE are fiendish, although not insoluble. As we have stressed several times thus far, to fully understand a population's behavioural indicators requires in-depth knowledge of its psychology, society, culture and habits etc. This is the very same stuff that TAA researches.

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<sup>15</sup> The United States Agency for International Development.

Only by knowing the dominant indicators (i.e., the behaviours that reflect the will, beliefs, attitudes, motivations etc. of an audience) is it possible to establish suitable MOEs with confidence. Yet crucially, this cannot be done as an afterthought or further upstream. Commanders need to be thinking in advance about what needs to be researched, and which indicators the TAA research needs to measure, as well as their baseline values. Preparing in advance for Influence and MOE will avoid having to play catch-up later on.

A solution to the perils of traditional MOE is Audience-Based Measures of Effectiveness (AB-MOE). If TAA is the process of conducting research to determine: what group behaviour should be influenced and how? AB-MOE provides the converse: what would change if behaviour were successfully influenced? Both are dependent on data collected from the audience during the TAA field-research, and the AB-MOE requires further data collection (on the same measures as during the TAA research) after the intervention. Both are frameworks built with emphasis on measuring indicators of group behaviour (as opposed to purely attitudinal measures). The advantage of this approach is that it intimately connects the TAA process with the evaluation process such that there is a snug 'fit' between the data for both, and consequently the link between target audience and behavioural change can be more accurately computed, rather than relying on some external indicator of success that may not be directly related to the influence campaign.

The most direct indicators are those derived from the Target Audience themselves (Audience-Based Indicators). These measurements can be of several types: collective perceptions; social norms; psychosocial group attributes which define behavioural propensities; reports of observed behaviour; individual behavioural intentions. In addition, metrics which are not derived directly from the audience – but which have been established in TAA as relating to the psychological and behavioural make-up of the audience – can be important if they provide insight into group behaviour. They can be drawn from datasets, such as classified reports of violence, intelligence reporting, broader economic data, or web-based news and sentiment analysis. These are combined with the AB-Indicators to construct a robust and comprehensive MOE instrument. However, not all behavioral indicators are of equal importance. Therefore, AB-MOE is also concerned with establishing weights that relate the most important behavioural indicators with the desired effect. For instance, understanding that not going to the mosque is a more important and valid behavioural indicator of fear than not going to the market.

## Case Studies

In closing it might be helpful to consider a case study or two. The first one is far removed from Afghanistan and conflict. In 1994 the Piaggio Motor Scooter company found itself lagging behind its competitors in global sales. The company brought in all kinds of management accountants and business analysts to determine the problem and found that it was the product's reputation for safety and unreliability that was depressing its market share. How then to improve quality? A further series of consultants and analysts were brought in with various programmes, incentives, rewards, and punishments for the workforce – all with little effect on output or quality. But then the company commissioned a TAA of the workforce and found that the key influence in the workforce community was the matriarchal figure – the almost caricatured figure of the generously built Italian 'Mama' resplendent in apron and rolling pin. Yet 'Mama' exerted significant influence over her husband, her sons and brothers and, with a carefully constructed campaign that majored on the domestic problems that unchecked reliability problems would cause HER family (not the company) – potential of injury (for all the workers rode Piaggios), loss of market share leading to reduction in earnings, loss of jobs etc. - and then sat back and waited. And, metaphorically the caricatured figure waved her rolling pin and the now rather less lazy, less *laissez-faire* behaviour of the mainly male workforce set to work. Piaggio's reliability record improved, so too its sales and its profits again began to climb.

A second example – and one provided in part to Andrew Mackay by journalist Tom Coghlan of *The Times* newspaper - can be found with the problems of the Afghan National

Police. Unlike the ANA, the ANP struggles to be trusted and professional - much attention (and aid money) is focussed on building confidence in it as an arm of the National Government. But how can we influence the young men of the Police Force to follow a more law abiding and less corrupt path? Interestingly one of the solutions may be in the value that Afghan society places upon marriage and the problem that many young men now have of fulfilling their dowry commitment. Thaler and Sunstein (mentioned earlier) talk of how subtle behavioural 'nudges' can often have significant, perhaps almost disproportionate, effects on behaviour. We know that marriage is valued, brings great honour and prestige and we also know that to get married, young men need cash. The ANP currently number some 80,000 officers and we know that each Police Station costs around \$6m to construct, equip and fortify. If the average dowry is \$10,000, it would seem that an incentivised programme might cost less than 2 police stations - so given enough financial resource and a proper TAA we might endeavour to understand how to link ANP officer's behaviour with the award of a financial incentive that might be made after, say, four years unblemished service, and used as a full or part dowry. TAA would almost certainly reveal how to encourage the audience to make the connection between behaviour and reward, how it should fit with their motivation and internal reward structures and how it could be communicated properly in their values, attitudes & beliefs.

## Conclusions

Influence has become the 'must have' accessory for the battlefield. Good. But think at how difficult it is to influence, say, your teenage kids, into a particular course of action. You know them. They have grown up in your house. You know the groups they belong to, their interests, their likes and dislikes. Yet as every parent knows influencing a 16 year old into a particular course of action can be difficult. Now apply this thinking to an Afghan whom you do not know, who has grown up in a completely different culture with different values and beliefs anchored in a wholly different world from our own. You want to influence them? Wow! This is hard stuff to do and whilst the UK's capability and understanding has leapt forward in the last couple of years there is still much work to do – particularly in the reinforcement of TAA and understanding MOE. Above all else doctrine needs to manage expectations.

**“Understanding Rocket Science is child’s play in comparison to ..... understanding child’s play”**

-oOo-

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### **Disclaimer**

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